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IN THE “BEST INTERESTS” OF THE DISABLED:  
LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE POWER TO 
INITIATE SUPPORT ORDERS FOR DISABLED 
ADULTS IN OHIO 
KALYNNE PROCTOR* 
ABSTRACT 
Today’s reality is that many families have children who are faced with disabling 
conditions that prevent them from relinquishing their dependency on others. Often, 
the need for specialized treatment and care does not terminate once a severely 
disabled child reaches adulthood. While typically parents are relieved of their legal 
parental obligations to their adult-aged children, this is not the same case for parents 
with severely disabled children. In some respects, Ohio has recognized the financial 
difficulties divorced parents face when they are the sole caregivers of disabled, adult 
children. Although Ohio law requires that the noncustodial parent in a divorce pay 
child support for their disabled adult children if the disability arose prior to the child 
reaching eighteen, ambiguity in the law gives Ohio courts discretion to circumvent 
their jurisdiction in these particular situations. Currently, Ohio courts differ in how 
they interpret whether they retain jurisdiction to initiate support orders for disabled 
children after the disabled child has reached the age of majority. This discretion is 
problematic, and this type of arbitrary power punishes disabled adults for something 
beyond their control—namely, the timing of their caregivers’ divorce. This Note 
attempts to resolve the current ambiguity in Ohio law by arguing that Ohio law 
should be interpreted to reflect the inevitable overlap between a parent’s moral and 
legal duties and recognize the courts’ powers to initiate support orders for disabled 
adults.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The familiar saying that “it takes a village to raise a child” is currently a reality 
for most parents. This phrase is based on the premise that it takes more than one 
caregiver to successfully provide for all the needs and direction required to raise a 
child.1 Through historical transformations and leading moral views, family has 
ultimately been designated as the origin of such support. Many parents would tend to 
agree that family is often the best resource to shape children into productive 
members of society capable of self-support through nurturing and financial care. Of 
course, however, this conclusion is based on the presumption that all children will 
eventually “graduate” from their dependency on caregivers and become adults who 
are capable of providing for themselves, both physically and economically. 
But in reality, many families have children who will never be able to support 
themselves in their adult life.2 Many children, because of circumstances beyond their 
control, are faced with disabling conditions that prevent them from relinquishing 
their dependency on others.3 More often than not, the need for specialized care does 
                                                          
 1  See Joseph G. Healey, African Proverb of the Month: It Takes a Whole Village to Raise 
a Child, AFRIPROV.ORG (Nov. 1998), http://www.afriprov.org/african-proverb-of-the-
month/23-1998proverbs/137-november-1998-proverb.html. 
 2  In 2010, there were roughly 38.3 million people in the United States suffering from a 
severe disabling condition. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES: 2010 4 (2012).  
 3  This Note focuses on the population that have “severely disabling conditions.” Severe 
disability, for purposes of this Note, is defined as an individual with a disability who has a 
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not terminate once a severely disabled child reaches adulthood, resulting in their 
continual reliance on family support.4 There are larger legal implications when a 
child reaches adult status; while typically parents are relieved of parental obligations 
to their adult aged children, this is not the case for parents with severely disabled 
children.5 As a result, divorce court dockets now contain child support cases 
involving custodial parents with unique burdens due to difficulties related to lifelong 
care for their disabled adult children.6 
Ohio has recognized the financial difficulties divorced parents face when they are 
the sole caregivers of disabled, adult children.7 Ohio law generally requires the 
noncustodial parent in the divorce to pay child support for their disabled adult 
children if the onset of the disability arose prior to the child reaching the age of 
eighteen.8 However, due to ambiguity in the law, Ohio courts retain discretion to 
circumvent their jurisdiction within these particular situations. Currently, Ohio 
courts differ in how they interpret whether they retain jurisdiction to initiate support 
orders for disabled children after the disabled child has reached the age of majority.9 
This discretion is problematic. It gives Ohio courts the power to circumvent their 
jurisdiction over a case involving the support of disabled adults solely because the 
parents’ marriage ended in divorce after the disabled child reached adulthood.10 This 
type of arbitrary power punishes disabled adults for something beyond their 
control—namely, the timing of their caregivers’ divorce. As a result, custodial 
parents are often left with the financial responsibility of supporting their disabled 
adult child while the noncustodial parent escapes with a “get out of jail free” card. 
                                                                                                                                         
severe physical or mental impairment which seriously limits one or more functional capacities 
(such as mobility, communication, self-care, self-direction, interpersonal skills, work 
tolerance, or work skills) in terms of employment outcome, whose rehabilitation can be 
expected to require multiple rehabilitation services over an extended period of time. Individual 
with a Severe Disability, LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY, http://www.lectlaw.com/def/i033.htm (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 4  See Jeffrey W. Childers, Hendricks v. Sanks: One Small Step for the Continued 
Parental Support of Disabled Children Beyond the Age of Majority in North Carolina, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 2094, 2094-95 (2002). 
 5  Id. 
 6  Laura W. Morgan, Termination of Child Support- Exception for Adult Children with 
Disabilities, NCSL.ORG (May 6, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/termination-of-child-support-exception-for-adult.aspx. 
 7  Id. 
 8  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (West 2016) (“The duty of support to a child imposed 
pursuant to a child support order shall continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday . . . [if] 
[t]he child is mentally or physically disabled and is incapable of supporting or maintaining 
himself or herself.”). 
 9 See Donohoo v. Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105 (12th Dist.); In re Edgel, 2010-Ohio-6435 
(11th Dist.); Wiczynski v. Wiczynski, 2006-Ohio-867 (6th Dist.); Abbas v. Abbas, 715 
N.E.2d 613 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); cf. Geygan v. Geygan, 973 N.E.2d 276 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1965) (demonstrating that a court does not have jurisdiction to initiate support order when 
child has already reached the age of majority). 
 10  See Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105 ¶¶ 17-19 (discussing Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E. 2d 803 
(1984)). 
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This unfortunate circumstance became a reality for a divorced, single mother in 
the 2012 Ohio case, Geygan v. Geygan.11 In Geygan, the marriage between parents 
of two children began to deteriorate after thirty-eight years, ultimately resulting in 
divorce.12 One of their children, over the age of eighteen at the time of divorce, had 
severe physical and developmental disabilities since birth and was unable to 
accomplish self-support.13 Prior to the divorce, both parents shared the burdensome 
responsibility of supporting their disabled child financially.14 However, the divorce 
proceedings deemed the mother the custodial parent, responsible for the daily care 
and support of her disabled adult child.15 Due to the need for continued care, coupled 
with the economic hardships involved in raising a disabled adult, the mother sought 
court assistance to obtain financial support from her ex-husband.16 
Upon review by the Tenth District Court of Appeals, the court refused to help the 
mother obtain the financial assistance she desperately sought and denied her request 
accordingly.  Instead, the court decided that it lacked jurisdiction to initiate a support 
order for a disabled adult, despite the fact that it retained power to continue child 
support for an adult child when such authority was first exercised before the child’s 
eighteenth birthday.17 In other words, the court held that a support order must already 
be in place prior to the disabled child reaching the age of majority in order to receive 
support from a non-custodial parent in the child’s adult life.18 According to Geygan, 
timing is essential in determining the outcome of these cases.19  
However, the court fails to acknowledge the underlying morality behind the legal 
obligation to support disabled adults. How can parents predict the timing of their 
divorce? What about the morality concerns for disabled adult children that triggered 
legal intervention in the first place? According to some Ohio courts, these inquiries 
are irrelevant.20 
Most people would generally agree that moral, noncustodial parents in a divorce 
should bear the duty of supporting their disabled adult child. Although some scholars 
attribute the legal duty of support to legislative efforts to eliminate resource 
dependency, this Note contends that evolving moral views towards the traditionally 
oppressed ultimately trigger legislative action. Accordingly, this Note argues that 
Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code21 should be interpreted to reflect the 
overlap between a parent’s moral and legal duties and recognize the courts’ power to 
initiate support orders for disabled adults. 
                                                          
 11  Geygan, 2012-Ohio-1965. 
 12  Id. at 277. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. at 279. 
 18  Id. at 280-81. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. at 279.  
 21  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (West 2016). 
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Section II of this Note provides background insight into the inevitable overlap 
between law and morality in American society. In doing so, this Note illustrates 
specific areas of law that supplement moral duties with legislation, focusing mainly 
on judicial and legislative dependence on morality in family law and support 
obligations. Section III of this Note begins to analyze why it is necessary to legislate 
morality in order to establish the authority for courts to initiate support orders for the 
disabled. To that end, this Note discusses how the moral duty to support disabled 
children throughout adulthood triggered legislative action in the first place. In light 
of the foregoing, this Note argues that courts should follow precedent and rely on 
morality concerns to establish jurisdiction and justify their power to initiate support 
under Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code.  Because of the current ambiguity 
in Ohio law, this Note ultimately proposes that Section 3119.86 should be amended 
to expressly provide for the mandated support of severely disabled children beyond 
the age of majority, regardless of whether the support order is initiated in domestic 
relations courts prior to or after the disabled child reaches the age of majority. 
In further support of this proposal, Section III-B of this Note presents a 
compelling approach to the idea of legislating morality and notes that optimized 
results will occur if the Ohio legislature supplements moral obligations with 
legislation and expressly grant courts the authority to initiate support orders for 
disabled adults. This Note supplements these arguments by analyzing the various 
stances of the Ohio district courts of appeals on this particular issue, favoring those 
decisions that overlap with moral principles. Finally, this Note examines how other 
states approach the issue of support orders for adult disabled dependents.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  “Legislating Morality”:  Review of Judicial and Legislative Dependence on 
Morality in American Law 
Society cannot thrive in an orderly fashion without morality. While some 
commentators may argue against legislating morality into codified law,22 it cannot be 
denied that in many areas of our legal system the two concepts are virtually 
inseparable.23 Despite unrealistic views that legislating morality is deficient, the 
reality is that the majority of successful regulations today legislate by directly 
mimicking underlying moral principles.24 The concept of morality itself involves a 
particular system of values and principles that create a doctrine of appropriate 
conduct held by society.25 It is, therefore, cognizable that our laws often stem from a 
system of such values and beliefs in determining what behaviors to regulate.26 
Because law and morality both aim to control the undesirable conduct of individuals, 
                                                          
 22  See Sarah Braasch, Morality Has No Place in the Law, PATHEOS:  DAYLIGHT ATHEISM 
(Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/daylightatheism/2011/01/morality-has-no-
place-in-the-law/.  
 23  Michael Bauman, Law and Morality, CHRISTIAN RES. INST. (Apr. 17, 2009), 
http://www.equip.org/article/law-and-morality/. 
 24  Id.  
 25  Morality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/morality (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) 
 26  Bauman, supra note 23. 
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in certain circumstances, it is necessary for morality to serve as the foundation for 
legal or political systems.27 
A prime example of morality placed at the core of legal and political 
jurisprudence comes from the U.S. Constitution.28  When drafting the Constitution, 
the Founding Fathers exemplified the importance of aggregating moral norms with 
law.29 In light of the oppressive, monarchical atmosphere surrounding its creation, 
the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution recognizing that political figures’ 
actions could deviate from morality and eventually become unjust.30 Moreover, 
because the Constitution was based on concepts of liberty and justice, morality 
inevitably played a crucial role in the formulation of the “Law of the Land.”31 
Therefore, at the time of its creation, the Constitution symbolized a roadmap for 
creating a nation grounded in morality and order through the establishment of 
binding assertions on how a model society should operate.32 
Morality continues to have the power of influence over laws today because it 
provides the rationale behind making immoral actions unlawful.33 It is now widely 
accepted that morality serves as the public expression behind laws “which [codify] 
in a public way the basic principles of conduct which a society accepts.”34 It is 
virtually inevitable that every legislative enactment speaks to moral values and 
judgments, helping society differentiate right from wrong, innocence from guilt, and 
justice from injustice.35 As scholar Jane C. Murphy suggests, “Each time the 
Government, through its lawmakers, decides to regulate or refrains from regulating, 
a choice in values is made.”36 
Although there are several technical distinctions between American law and 
morality, it is evident that—in certain areas of law—the overlap between the two is 
necessary to successfully regulate societal conduct and promote fairness and 
justice.37 While morality alone may not shape the behavior of those too stubborn to 
conform, laws grounded in morality counter this issue, not only by distinguishing 
right from wrong, but also by penalizing those individuals who refuse to learn from 
                                                          
 27  Braasch, supra note 22. 
 28  See U.S. CONST. 
 29  Bauman, supra note 23. 
 30  See id. (discussing how the “founding fathers understood the actions of King George 
were morally evil and politically unjust”). 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33  See Ira H. Peak, Jr., Dworkin and Hart on the Law: A Polanyian Reconsideration, 18 
TRADITION & DISCOVERY: THE POLANYI SOCIETY PERIODICAL 22, 25 (1991-92) (discussing 
how legal rules have a connection to morals in both origin and interpretation). 
 34  See Jan Edward Garrett, Basic Observations on Law and Morality (Sept. 10, 2001), 
http://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/320/320lawmo.htm. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New 
Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1133 (1999). 
 37  See Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1035, 1036 (2008). 
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the repercussions of their harmful actions.38 This makes it clear that law is 
sometimes needed to replace moral obligations in order to enhance a uniform and 
orderly nation.39 Therefore, laws are maximized when the legal system places a duty 
on its citizens in the interests of the public by legally imposing legitimate moral 
obligations.40 
1. Brief Overview of Areas of Law that Regulate Morality 
a. Legislating Morality in Criminal Law 
Some scholars of philosophy suggest, “It is a proper function of the criminal law 
to promote good character, and to restrain or discourage people from engaging in 
activities that cause moral harm to themselves or others.”41 With that being said, it is 
generally accepted that morality and law regulate most behaviors that are criminal in 
nature.42 Societal values and beliefs regarding certain acts often trigger legislative 
action in the field of criminal law.43 In determining the behaviors that warrant 
criminalization, the necessary preconditions focus on identifying the objects of moral 
concern.44 
Despite the fact that not all behaviors considered immoral or unethical justify 
criminal penalties, moral and legal sanctions often result when private gains and 
utility from undesirable conduct are particularly significant.45 Take, for example, the 
criminal outlaw of prostitution, rape, murder, and theft. Most would agree that these 
actions are not only illegal but also immoral. Without legal intervention against these 
immoral acts, criminals stand to gain insurmountable private benefits, both in 
economic terms and their power and control over the livelihood of others.46 
b. Legislating Morality in Contract Law 
In the history of contract law, it was once believed that “contracts were made in 
the presence of God and consequently certain moral standards were implicit in 
creating and executing the agreement.”47 In present day, evidence of these implicit 
                                                          
 38  See Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. ECON. 
REV. 227, 246-51 (2001), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell/pdf/4_Amer_Law_Econ_Rev_227.pdf. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. at 248-49. 
 41  John Danaher, Enforcing Morality Through Criminal Law, PHILOSOPHICAL 
DISQUISITIONS (May 10, 2014), 
http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/2014/05/enforcing-morality-through-criminal-
law.html. 
 42  Richard C. Fuller, Morals and the Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 624, 628 
(1942). 
 43  Id. 
 44  Danaher, supra note 41, at 1. 
 45  Shavell, supra note 38, at 246-47.   
 46  Id. 
 47  Brad Reid, Morality Is Part of Contract Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-reid/morality-is-part-of-contr_b_1195172.html. 
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moral standards are still embedded in the obligations of this legal doctrine,48 and it is 
unlikely that they will fade. Legal duties created in the field of contract law are often 
justified by their relationship to the moral obligations imposed on every agent.49 
Specifically, many scholars claim that contract law is justifiable through the 
enforcement of moral commitments to keep one’s promises.50 Because the 
enforcement of contracts is interchangeable with the notion of promises, morality 
plays a central role in shaping the possible remedies for the breach of such promises. 
In the event of a breach of contract, one party may suffer significant loss, which 
invokes the notion of unfairness.51 In determining what is fair and unfair regarding 
the subsequent execution and outcome of agreements, moral beliefs and values are 
echoed as a result.52 
Morality also plays a vital part in how courts interpret agreements that are 
ambiguous in nature.53  In the context of contractual interpretation, the doctrine of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a specific example of the 
interplay between morality and the law.54  Courts consider the doctrine to be the 
“backstop” that “requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from 
arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party 
to the contract from receiving the fruits of the bargain.”55 Court reliance on the 
doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing reflects moral views 
in determining which types of behaviors constitute arbitrariness and 
unreasonableness, which bears on the legality and enforcement of an agreement.56 
c. Legislating Morality in Civil Rights Law 
Undoubtedly, American civil rights laws have moral-based origins.57 With 
promotion of fairness and equality as the underlying objective behind civil rights 
laws, the concepts are categorically equivalent to morality.58 The emergence of 
America’s civil rights laws would not have come into existence without the gradual 
                                                          
 48  Id. 
 49  Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1603, 1612-14 (2009). 
 50  Id. at 1613. 
 51  Reid, supra note 47. 
 52  Id. (quoting Clean Harbors, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen, Inc. (citing Alliance Data Systems 
Corp. v. Blackstone Capital) (“The Court noted approvingly that this covenant is a ‘backstop’ 
that ‘requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable 
conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the 
fruits of the bargain.’”)). 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. (quoting Alliance Data Systems Corp. v. Blackstone Capital).  
 56  Id. 
 57  Christopher Beem, A Symposium on Legislating Morality: Can Legislation Solve our 
Moral Problems, COMM. NETWORK, 
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ccps/rcq/legislating_morality.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2017). 
 58  Green, supra note 37, at 1046. 
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evolution of society’s moral views that all citizens deserve equal treatment. This 
notion—that fairness and equality in our civil protections result from morality—is 
arguably corroborated by the historical outlawing of behaviors once viewed as 
acceptable but subsequently deemed immoral.59 
One of the earliest examples of this evolution is the abolition of slavery in the 
United States. Once viewed as acceptable, slavery gradually became immoral.60 
Once society’s moral views regarding slavery changed, legislation soon followed.61 
Similarly, civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination of historically oppressed 
groups also delineate moral norms that all citizens should be protected from unjust 
and prejudicial treatment, regardless of race, age, gender, sex, or capabilities.62 
B. Review of Judicial and Legislative Dependence on Morality in Family Law 
Jurisprudence 
1. Correlation between Moral and Legal Duties in Family Law 
Similar to how morals are basic to the everyday function of families, morality 
has also played a central role in the development of family law.63 Generally, law 
typically intervenes in family life when urgent moral issues arise.64 When such issues 
arise, it is especially true in the field of family law that society and legislators 
believe the law should be based on moral principles.65 The emphasis on morality in 
family jurisprudence results in the deliberate incorporation of moral principles into 
statutes and case law.66 Whereas in other areas of law courts may be more hesitant to 
rely entirely on morality in justifying their decisions, it has generally been the norm 
for family law courts and statutes to do so explicitly.67 In fact, in family law 
jurisprudence, it is common for courts to waive requirements of fact-based 
justifications that fail to incorporate morality into their decisions.68 
The reality is that law and morality are essentially interchangeable in the field of 
family law. As scholar Katharine Bartlett notes, “Family law is soaked in moral 
judgments that both reinforce the law and are reinforced by it. At some level, the 
question is not whether family law should reflect moral principles but what those 
                                                          
 59  Bauman, supra note 23, at 3 (discussing the abolition of slavery). 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. at 3-4. 
 63  Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 
83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1806 (1985). 
 64  Id. at 1806. 
 65  Id. 
 66  For instance, marriage and divorce law reflects moral beliefs. See id. at 1809, 1811. 
Child support laws and social security regulations reflect moral beliefs as well. Id. at 1812-
1813. 
 67  Murphy, supra note 36, at 1115-16. 
 68  See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 3 Day 37, 41-42, 50-51 (Conn. 1808); Castle v. Castle, 
473 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ohio 1984). 
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principles will be.”69 With regard to which moral principles family law should 
consider, some scholars assert that family law should aim to promote “a substantive 
moral vision of commitment and responsibility.”70 Meanwhile, others envision 
family law as an opportunity to emphasize issues of obligation and moral 
responsibility.71 
In recent trends, however, this reliance on morality has begun to shift, as 
morality maintains its significance in some aspects of family law and diminishes in 
other areas.72 Some scholars contend that this new shift in the placement of moral 
concerns in family law should be “grounded in equality, fairness, commitment, and 
nurturance.”73 Despite the decreasing significance of morality in some areas of 
family law, what has remained consistent is that the support of dependents still has 
meaning.74 From a philosophical standpoint, scholars contend, “[T]he nurturing of 
children out to be included in our list of the central or the cardinal virtues. Indeed 
even one wishes to distinguish between public virtues and private virtues, the virtue 
of nurturing children belongs high on both lists.”75 It was these types of moral 
concerns and beliefs that led to the importance of maintaining and supporting 
vulnerable dependents.76 
a. Correlation between Moral and Legal Duty to Support “Dependents”: Child 
Support 
Courts have uniformly reiterated that “we see no difference in principle between 
the duty imposed upon the parent to support the [minor] child and the obligation to 
care for the [disabled] adult, who is equally, if not more, dependent upon the 
parent.”77 Because the principles amongst these two types of support obligations are 
related, it is essential to first examine the evolution of the duty to support minor 
children. 
                                                          
 69  Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
809, 816 (1998). See generally Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, 
Interdependence and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 287-88 (2000) 
(discussing different scholars’ views on the role of morality in family law). 
 70  Wriggins, supra note 69, at 289. Milton C. Regan argues that family law should not be 
based on a model of individual private ordering but should “promote a substantive moral 
vision of commitment and responsibility.” MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE 
PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 4 (1993). 
 71  See Wriggins, supra note 69, at 289 (quoting Martha L. Minow, All in the Family and 
in all Families: Membership, Loving and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 306 (1992-93)). 
 72  See id. at 289 (quoting Naomi R. Cahn, Review Essay: The Moral Complexities of 
Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 238 (1997)).  
 73  Id. at 289 (quoting Cahn, supra note 73, at 238)). 
 74  See Murphy, supra note 35 at 1128.  
 75  Id. at 1129 (quoting Michael J. Meyer, Family Virtues and the Common Good, 36 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 409, 413-14 (1996)). 
 76  See id. at 1129-30. 
 77  Crain v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky. 1908) (discussing rationale for imposing 
financial obligation on parents to support disabled adult beyond the age of majority). 
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Our laws regulate “dependents” and their support through policies reinforced by 
morality; the policies are also aimed at governing the social and material 
environments the dependents inhabit and the resources to which they have access.78 
Social policy, by its very definition, can have a cause-and-effect type influence on 
the welfare of dependents.79 As a result, one cannot merely disregard the impact that 
morally driven policies derived from religious, racial, ideological, scientific, and 
philosophical ideas have had on the legal emergence of support obligations.80 
b. Historical Views of Children: From Child Labor to Fairytale View 
In order to understand the role morality played in the development of the legal 
obligation to support dependent children, it is first critical to examine the evolving 
perceptions of children.  The concept of “childhood” has historically been the 
product of social construction, which has continued to change and evolve.81 Prior to 
the commencement of the nineteenth century, legal and societal views of 
“childhood,” as we perceive it today, were nonexistent.82 During this period, familial 
roles involved utilizing children as economic devices, allowing caregivers the 
autonomy to be dependent, in part, on their children as a means for financial 
sustainability.83 As early as the medieval era, historians began identifying society’s 
lack of recognition of “childhood” as a distinct stage of life.84 During the medieval 
era, children were virtually indistinguishable from their adult counterparts and 
deemed fully integrated members of the community.85 Symbolized socially as young 
adults, children as young as seven years old were apprenticed and used as tools for 
acquiring earnings.86 
                                                          
 78  For purposes of this Note, “dependents” refers to children and the severely disabled. 
Annette Ruth Appell, Child-Centered Jurisprudence and Feminist Jurisprudence Exploring 
the Connections and Tensions: The Pre-Political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 
HOUS. L. REV. 703, 708 (2009) (quoting Allison James et al., Care and Control in the 
Construction of Children's Citizenship, in CHILDREN AND CITIZENSHIP 85, 88 (Antonella 
Invernizzi & Jane Williams eds., 2008)). 
 79  The Department of Social Policy at the London School of Economics defines social 
policy as “an interdisciplinary and applied subject concerned with the analysis of societies’ 
responses to social need.” About Us, LONDON SCH. OF ECON., 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/socialPolicy/AboutUs/introduction.aspx (last updated Sept. 28, 2016). 
 80  See Appell, supra note 78, at 708-11. 
 81  See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: 
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085-86 (1991). 
 82  Id. at 1093-94. 
 83  See Appell, supra note 78, at 745-46. 
 84  PHILIPPE. ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 20–32 
(Robert Baldick, trans.) (1970) (discussing stages of life in other civilizations and cultures). 
 85  See Ainsworth, supra note 81, at 1092-93 (discussing that the primary age-based 
boundary was drawn at infancy and that a time of physical dependence ended roughly at age 
seven during this era). 
 86  Jim Vandergriff, Factors Influencing The Development of The Idea of Childhood in 
Europe and America, 
http://faculty.knox.edu/jvanderg/201_Website_S_08/HistoryofChildhood.html (last visited 
January 29, 2017).  
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For much of the eighteenth century, families valued children mainly because the 
child was able to contribute to the household economy.87 This often meant that 
children were subjected to agricultural labor for the sole purpose of raising revenue 
for the family unit.88 One historian notes, “[T]he services or wages of a child over 
ten was one of the most valuable assets a man could have.”89
The ideology of children as “economic tools” continued to progress into the era 
when the U.S. economy transitioned from agriculture to industry.90 Consequently, 
the rise in the Industrial Revolution continued to profoundly affect the historical 
views of children.91 As early as 1870 through World War I, the Industrial Revolution 
brought a rise in factories, coupled with a new demand for abled laborers.92 The 
sudden growth of “factory towns” was, therefore, accompanied by urbanization, 
which relocated families from rural to urban America.93 The influx of urbanization 
incidentally led to the need for families to achieve more money as opposed to 
commodities.94 The demand for more cash meant that lower-income families were 
faced with the reality that the entire family, including children, were crucial 
economic assets for meeting the needs of the family unit.95 Factory employers even 
preferred child labor because employers viewed children, compared to adults, as 
easier to manage, cheaper, and less likely to strike.96 
Prior to the nineteenth century, there was a presumption that able-bodied children 
must work.97 Thus, during this time frame, there was no legislation to support the 
interest of working children.98 This lack of regulation stemmed from the belief that 
“the policy of our laws which are ever watchful to promote industry, did not mean to 
compel a father to maintain his idle and lazy children in ease and indolence.”99 
                                                          
 87  Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and 
Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1123, 1129 (1999). 
 88  See generally Appell, supra note 77, at 745-46 (discussing the transition from children 
working in the fields to factory laborers). 
 89  MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 6 (1994). 
 90  Marie A. Failinger, “Too Cheap Work for Anybody but Us”: Toward a Theory and 
Practice of Good Child Labor, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 1035, 1082 (2004). 
 91  E. Ill. Univ., Childhood Lost: Child Labor During the Industrial Revolution, EIU.EDU, 
http://www.eiu.edu/eiutps/childhood.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 92  Id. 
 93  Failinger, supra note 90, at 1048.    
 94  See Hansen, supra note 87, at 1053, 1131-32.   
 95  See E. Ill. Univ., supra note 91. 
 96  Child Labor in U.S. History, CHILD LABOR PUB. EDUC. PROJECT, 
http://www.continuetolearn.uiowa.edu/laborctr/child_labor/about/us_history.html (last visited 
Jan. 29 2017). 
 97  See Hansen, supra note 87, at 1129-30. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN L. REV. 
710, 713 (2007) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
437 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765)). 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/10
2017] IN THE “BEST INTERESTS” OF THE DISABLED 467 
 
It was not until the turn of the nineteenth century that the burdens of financial 
dependency shifted from children to their caregivers.100 Historians have noticed the 
progression of societal conceptions of children as society began to recognize our 
modern views of “childhood.”101 During the Enlightenment and Romantic Era, “the 
view of children as economic assets began to give way to a more romantic, idealized 
view of childhood among the middle and upper classes.”102 Childhood symbolized a 
distinct stage of life that required special effort to care for a child’s needs.103 
c. Changing Views Led to Emergence of Moral Duty to Support Dependent Children 
The societal change in viewing children at the onset of the nineteenth century 
brought forth new moral notions of parental responsibility.104 With the emergence of 
child labor laws, the presumption that children were economic tools was replaced by 
beliefs that children are vulnerable and wholly dependent on adult guidance, making 
the child’s care the leading interest.105 From a philosophical standpoint, childhood 
was completely redefined, and children were deemed prospectively different from 
adults.106 This newly idealized view of childhood subsequently led to the emergence 
of a moral obligation to support children.107 From this point forward, society 
regarded parents as the source of guidance and care for their dependent children. 
There have been competing justifications behind the gradual emergence of the 
moral duty that parents have to support their children.108 One justification for such a 
duty can be traced to religious beliefs and views regarding the relationship between 
parents and their children.109 Because “[t]he United States is one of the most 
religious countries in the world,”110 it is fathomable that views embedded within 
certain religions have played a significant role in guiding parental commitments to 
their children. 
Specifically, there are roots of parents’ moral duties to support their children 
ingrained in Christian beliefs.111 From beginning to end, the Christian Bible not only 
                                                          
 100  Id. at 713-15. 
 101  John Clarke, Histories of Childhood, in CHILDHOOD STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 5, 
(Dominic Wyse, ed. 2004), 
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/bpl_images/content_store/sample_chapter/0631
233962/wyse%2002chap01.pdf. 
 102  Hansen, supra note 87, at 1129.   
 103  Id. 
 104  See Clarke, supra note 101, at 9-10. 
 105  Id. at 9. 
 106  Arlene Skolnick, Children’s Rights, Children’s Development, in THE FUTURE OF 
CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 138, 150 (Lamar T. Empey ed., 1979). 
 107  Id. at 151. 
 108  See Buhai, supra note 99, at 737-38. 
 109  See id. at 738. 
 110  Susan D. Holloway, The Role of Religious Beliefs in Early Childhood Education: 
Christian and Buddhist Preschools in Japan, EARLY CHILDHOOD RESEARCH AND PRACTICE, 
Fall 1999. http://ecrp.uiuc.edu/v1n2/holloway.html. 
 111  See Buhai, supra note 99, at 738-39. 
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references the importance of children, but also speaks to parents’ duties to support 
them.112 Christian scripture teaches, “Children are a heritage from the Lord, offspring 
a reward from him. Like arrows in the hands of a warrior are children born in one’s 
youth. Blessed is the man whose quiver is full of them”"113 With the underlying view 
that children are an important gift from God, the Bible repeatedly places great 
emphasis on a parent’s duty to provide for them.114 Christian beliefs even go so far as 
to deem parents immoral and infidel if they fail to provide for their own children.115 
Although morality does not necessarily implicate religious origins, another 
leading justification behind the moral obligation of dependent support stems from 
natural law principles.116 According to English jurist William Blackstone, “The duty 
of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children . . . is an obligation laid on 
them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into 
the world.”117 Blackstone reasoned, “By begetting them, therefore, they have entered 
into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they 
have bestowed shall be supported and preserved.”118 
The natural law theory that parents must support children stems from the belief 
that children do not have the ability to provide for themselves.119 It has been 
continually contemplated and agreed that “[t]he wants and weaknesses of children 
render it necessary that some person maintains them, and the voice of nature has 
pointed out the parents as the most fit and proper persons.”120 Furthermore, natural 
law theory provides, “The obligation on the part of the parent to maintain the child 
continues until the latter is in a condition to provide for its own maintenance.”121 
Thus, Blackstone believed that the “insuperable degree of affection between parents 
and their children was sufficient evidence of parental support to obviate the need for 
legal sanctions.”122 
                                                          
 112  See id. at 738. 
 113  Psalm 127:3-5 (New Int’l). 
 114  “Behold, the third time I am ready to come to you; and I will not be burdensome to 
you: for I seek not yours, but you: for the children ought not to lay up for the parents, but the 
parents for the children.” 2 Corinthians 12:14 (King James). “And in all the land were no 
women found so fair as the daughters of Job: and their father gave them inheritance among 
their brethren.” Job 42:15 (King James). “A good person leaves an inheritance for their 
children’s children, but a sinner’s wealth is stored up for the righteous.” Proverbs 13:22 (King 
James). 
 115  “But if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath 
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” 1 Timothy 5:8 (King James). 
 116  Buhai, supra note 99, at 737, 747. 
 117  Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 616 (N.C. 1947) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES 419 (Lewis ed. 1897)). 
 118  Id. at 616-17. 
 119  Id. at 616. 
 120  Id. at 617 (quoting C. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 190 (Lecture 
29)). 
 121  Id.  
 122  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *424, *448. 
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d. Noncustodial Parents’ Legal Duties to Support Dependent Children Rely on 
Morality 
Moral concern for the welfare of dependent children and the societal issues 
related to their care transgressed into family law’s focus on noncustodial support 
obligations.123 Child support laws have progressed and evolved significantly 
throughout American history.124 In understanding the courts’ reliance on morality in 
justifying support obligations, it is critical to view the reasoning provided in three of 
the earliest and leading child support cases.125 Although it has been argued that the 
purpose of these early child support cases was to curtail the problem of single parent 
and child dependency on the public, this Note argues that the courts’ reasoning for 
the payment of child support directly reflects the courts’ reliance on moral values as 
leading justifications. 
In 1808, the supreme court of Connecticut, in Stanton v. Stanton, allowed a wife 
to recover from her ex-husband for the support provided to their children.126 The 
Stanton court authorized recovery for the support of two of the children covered by 
the custody decree on the grounds that “[p]arents are bound by law to maintain, 
protect, and educate their legitimate children, during their infancy, or nonage.”127 
The court allowed recovery for support of the third child on the basis that “[t]he 
infant cast on the world must seek protection and safety where it can be found; and 
where, with more propriety can it apply, than to the next friend, nearest relative, and 
such as are most interested in its safety and happiness?”128 The court’s decision 
lacked justifications independent of the moral values relied on in reaching their 
conclusion.129 
In 1816, a New York trial court, in Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, considered a 
claim to recover the cost of a coat sold to a son on his father’s credit.130 In resolving 
the issue, the court relied solely on the notion that:  
A parent is under a natural obligation to furnish necessaries for his infant 
children; and if the parent neglect that duty, any other person who 
supplies such necessaries is deemed to have conferred a benefit on the 
delinquent parent, for which the law raises an implied promise to pay on 
the part of the parent.131 
Lastly, in the 1858 case of Tomkins v. Tomkins, a father abandoned his young 
child and wife. Because of the mother’s destitute state, the young child was sent to 
                                                          
 123  Murphy, supra note 67, at 1190. 
 124  Hansen, supra note 87, at 1125-26. 
 125  See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 3 Day 37 (Conn. 1808); Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J. Eq. 
512 (Ch. 1858); Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816). 
 126  Stanton, 3 Day 37. 
 127  Id. at 55. 
 128  Id. at 57-58. 
 129  Id. at 41. 
 130  Van Valkinburgh, 13 Johns. 480. 
 131  Id. 
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stay with her grandmother, who took on the responsibility of caring for the child.132 
In finding an obligation for the father to pay support for the expenses covered by 
another caregiver, the New Jersey Court of Chancery reasoned, “If a case can be 
suggested where the moral obligation of a father to provide for his offspring can be 
enforced as a legal one, it would be difficult to find one more apposite than this.”133 
The court further rationalized that “[t]here is no evidence that for the fifteen years 
the child was under the care of its grandmother, the father ever made any inquiry as 
to its whereabouts or welfare.”134 The court declared:  
Now, in view of all these facts, if there was any doubt as to the legal 
obligation of the father to provide for his child, and of his legal liability to 
such as should supply that child with the necessaries of life, the moral 
obligation is so strong that a court of equity would feel but little inclined 
to grant relief, on any such ground as that the moral obligation had been 
converted into a legal one.135 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Necessity of Legislating Morality for Support of Disabled Adult Children:  
Why Ohio Domestic Relations Courts Should Have Power to Initiate Support for 
Disabled Adults 
1. Connection between Moral and Legal Duty to Support “Dependents”:  Disabled 
Adult Support 
Generally, the obligation to support children until they have obtained the age of 
majority is imposed on parents by law.136 However, in many jurisdictions today, 
court decisions and legislative enactments go beyond the recognition of a mere duty 
to support children and also recognize the duty of parental support of disabled adult 
children as a matter of family law.137 Nevertheless, how did courts and legislators 
come to establish this new arena of family law jurisprudence when parents originally 
only had a moral and legal obligation to support their minor children? From a careful 
examination of historical views of the severely disabled, coupled with societal values 
and beliefs about their indefinite dependence on others for support and care, the 
answer to this question undoubtedly originates from morality. 
When reviewing Ohio court decisions and laws,138 as well as other jurisdictions’ 
stances on the duty to support disabled children through adulthood, it is evident that 
courts and legislators began to recognize the rise of moral concerns relating to the 
continued need for care and support of disabled children once they reach adult status. 
                                                          
 132  Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J. Eq. 512 (Ch. 1858). 
 133  Id. at 512. 
 134  Id.  
 135  Id. at 517-18. 
 136  The Duty to Support Adult Disabled Children, NAT’L LEGAL RES. GRP. INC. (1997), 
http://www.divorcesource.com/research/dl/childsupport/97oct188.shtml (citing 59 Am. Jur. 2d 
Parent and Child § 89 (1987); 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 62 (1978)). 
 137  Id. 
 138  See infra Section III.A.1.c. 
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These moral concerns ultimately demonstrated that legal intervention was necessary 
to resolve the problem of what should be done for the aid of disabled adult children. 
As a resolution, courts and lawmakers began to rely heavily on morality in deeming 
parents the responsible source for the aid of these individuals.139 
a. Historical View of Disabled Adults: From Dehumanized to Deinstitutionalized 
In examining the intermingling between morality and the subsequent obligation 
to support disabled adults, a basic understanding of the development of views 
towards the disabled is key. While today there is a general acceptance of empathy 
and special attention afforded to this group of individuals, from a historical 
perspective, this empathy has not always been present.140 
As early as the latter half of the twelfth century when religion was the main 
authority in guiding everyday life, negative views towards the disabled were the 
norm.141 There existed a general belief that the disabled—specifically, the mentally 
ill—were possessed by the devil or evil spirits.142 Consequently, individuals who fit 
within this category were often whipped, tortured, and burned at the stake.143 
Similarly, during early history, there was virtually no aid and financial support 
afforded to the disabled.144 Individuals suffering from an array of disabling 
conditions were often ejected from hospitals and poor shelters, having to rely on the 
humiliation of displaying their disabilities as a form of entertainment in return for 
food and shelter.145 
Beginning in the early nineteenth century when science began to substitute 
religious authority, societal views changed from perceiving the disabled as having 
spiritual defects to an understanding that disabilities resulted of genetic deficits.146 
With this change in view, society began to believe that support and care of disabled 
adults shifted to the public, with reliance solely on doctors, educators, and social 
workers as their custodians.147 State mental hospitals began to emerge as the first 
formal system of care for the intellectually disabled in the United States.148 While it 
may have been thought that the emergence of these institutions was to curtail prior 
inhumane treatment of the disabled, in reality, such negative views and treatment of 
this group became exacerbated.149 
                                                          
 139  Buhai, supra note 99, at 716-17. 
 140  See TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE app. 14C (Maurianne Adams, Lee 
Anne Bell, & Pat Griffin eds., 2nd ed. 2007). 
 141  Id.   
 142  Id.  
 143  Id.  
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Catherine K. Harbour & Pallab K. Maulik, History of Intellectual Disabilities, INT’L 
ENCYC. REHABILITATION (2010), http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/encyclopedia/en/article/143/. 
 149  Id.  
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Starting in the late 1800s and early 1900s, people with disabilities were 
segregated from the rest of the population into isolated institutions.150 The conditions 
in these institutions, however, were far from humane, and this period of 
institutionalization became characterized as a “cruel and oppressive period.”151 
During the institutionalization era, a eugenics movement surfaced.152 The goal of 
segregating the disabled was to protect the rest of the population from them while 
simultaneously limiting the disabled persons’ chances of reproduction.153 Because 
the disabled were perceived as carrying characteristics that weakened the human 
race, thousands of disabled individuals were sterilized to prevent passing undesirable 
genes on to future generations.154 Some eugenics advocates even went so far as 
supporting the euthanasia of disabled children to avoid passing on their genes.155 
Sterilization, however, was not the only startling practice used on the disabled 
during this period. In unwarranted efforts to rid the intellectually disabled from 
undesirable mental symptoms, professionals implemented several inhumane and 
torturous methods of therapy.156  One method involved the implementation of the 
“malarial therapy.”157 This method consisted of injecting malarial blood into 
intellectually disabled individuals, based on beliefs that mental symptoms sometimes 
disappeared in mental patients suffering from typhoid fever.158 Another method of 
ridding mental symptoms involved the “insulin coma therapy,” which was designed 
to place patients in a hypoglycemic state that caused comatose in an effort to rewire 
the brain and prevent characteristics associated with mental illness.159 
The injection of metrazol was also used on institutionalized patients to induce 
convulsions because it was believed that epileptics rarely suffered from such mental 
illnesses.160 In addition, institutions experimented with the use of “electroshock 
therapy,” which sent electric currents through the brain, in hopes of quickly 
reversing symptoms of certain mental illness.161 Professionals in these institutions 
even went so far as performing surgical procedures, which have been referred to as a 
                                                          
 150  Id. 
 151  Luana Olivas, Helping Them Rest in Peace: Confronting the Hidden Crisis Facing 
Aging Parents of Disabled Children, 10 ELDER L.J. 393, 399 (2002) (quoting DAVID L. 
BRADDOCK, THE STATE OF THE STATES IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 16 (5th ed. 1998)). 
 152  Savanna Logsdon-Breakstone, Disability History 101: The Rise of the Institution (Apr. 
23, 2012), https://disabilityrightnow.wordpress.com/2012/04/23/dis-hist-101-institutions/. 
 153  Harbour & Maulik, supra note 148. 
 154  Id.  
 155  Id. 
 156  See generally Renato M.E. Sabbatiri, BRAIN & Mind, The History of Shock Therapy in 
Psychiatry, http://www.cerebromente.org.br/n04/historia/shock_i.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2017). 
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lobotomy.162 Lobotomy involved severing the nerve fibers of the frontal lobe of the 
brain to completely prevent the reemergence of symptoms associated with mental 
disabilities.163 
Not only were nineteenth-century therapy treatments brutal, but the everyday 
conditions within the institutions were also substandard.164 The disabled were often 
punished severely for resisting the control of strait jackets and mechanical restraints 
as well as being placed in isolation for days on end.165 The dehumanized view of the 
disabled, along with a push for institutionalization in poor-conditioned facilities, 
remained the norm until views began to change, and pushes for deinstitutionalization 
began to arise, in the late twentieth century.166 
b. Changing Views Led to Emergence of Moral Duty to Support Disabled Adults 
Starting in the early 1970s, society’s views toward the disabled began to 
change.167 From this point forward, there has been a significant decline in the 
institutionalization of disabled patients.168 For the past four decades, there has now 
emerged the universal trend in the United States for individuals with disabilities to 
live in inclusive settings as opposed to exclusive settings, which were the norm prior 
to the late twentieth century.169  Specifically, “Whereas before, families were 
pressured to [send the disabled away to be isolated in institutions], they are now 
expected to be substantially involved in their care, if not directly responsible for 
it.”170 The mass deinstitutionalization, coupled with the evolved view that the family 
should support and care for the disabled in the least restrictive environment, directly 
reflects the emergence of the moral duty to support disabled adults. 
Many states ultimately began to recognize that a moral duty existed for a parent 
to continue to support children post-minority if the children were unable to support 
themselves due to a disabling condition.171 This moral duty found its roots in part 
from statutory provisions that assigned criminal penalties for not supporting minor 
children.172 However, there is also compelling evidence that this new rise in the 
                                                          
 162  Eds. of Encyc. Britannica, Lobotomy, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/lobotomy (last updated Dec. 17, 2012). 
 163  Id.  
 164  Dennis Felty, A Brief History: As Remembered by Dennis Felty, KEYSTONE HUM. 
SERVS., https://www.keystonehumanservices.org/about-us/history (last visited Feb 5, 2017).  
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 166  TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE app. 14C, supra note 140. 
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 168  CLAIRE LAVIN & KENNETH J. DOKA, OLDER ADULTS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES 15 (Jon Hendricks ed., 1999). 
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recognition of a moral duty for parents to support their disabled adult children also 
can be traced to principles of natural law, humanitarian perspectives, and religious 
views.173 
i. Moral Duties to Support Disabled Adults Stemmed from Natural Law 
Just as natural law played a role in the morality underpinning a parent’s duty to 
support minor children, natural law also influenced the moral obligation of parents to 
support disabled adult dependents.174  The theory of natural law involves “the 
unwritten body of universal moral principles that underlie the ethical and legal 
norms by which human conduct is sometimes evaluated and governed.”175 
Proponents of natural law theory believe that the government must incorporate 
universal, moral principles within natural law into legal systems before justice can be 
achieved.176 Therefore, scholars subsequently have described a parent’s moral 
obligation to his or her disabled adult children as an obligation of “natural law,” 
originating from the responsibility of bringing the child into the world.177 
Blackstone similarly characterized a parent’s duty to support disabled adult 
children as “a principle of natural law.”178 Specifically, he argued that as a matter of 
natural law, necessaries must be supplied for those who are incompetent and not 
capable of working.179 Accordingly, philosopher John Locke also believed that as a 
matter of natural law, all individuals in society, including the disabled, have the right 
of preservation.180 He argued that individuals have a natural right to the material 
necessities for survival.181 Under the theory of natural law, the voice of nature has 
deemed the parent the person fit to provide such material necessities.182 The moral 
duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children continues 
indefinitely until the child can provide for herself under this principle.183 According 
to natural law theorists, if the child never reaches the point where she is able to care 
for herself, the moral obligation continues.184 
                                                          
 173  Buhai, supra note 99, at 720, 727, 733, 737. 
 174  Id. at 737. 
 175  Natural Law, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Natural+Law+Theory (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).   
 176  See generally Buhai, supra note 99, at 716. 
 177  Id. at 737.   
 178  BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, at 435. 
 179  Id. at 437. 
 180  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Rod Hay ed., London 1823). 
 181  Id. 
 182  2 CHANCELLOR JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Lecture 29, 189, 190 
(1826-30).   
 183  Childers, supra note 4, at 2100. 
 184  Id.  
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 ii. Moral Duties to Support Disabled Adults Stemmed from Humanitarian Rules 
The emergence of societal views that parents are morally responsible for the 
support and maintenance of their disabled adult children also originates from 
humanitarian principles.185 Under theories of humanity, all citizens have moral 
obligations to treat others with kindness and benevolence.186 From a humanitarian 
perspective, there also exists a moral imperative to assist those in need.187 Scholars 
often have attributed a parent’s moral obligation to support disabled adult children to 
the humanitarian perspective that it is the right thing to do.188 
For example, philosopher Immanuel Kant characterized such a moral duty from 
the humanitarian point of view.189 According to Kant: 
Children, as persons, have, at the same time, an original congenital right, 
distinguished from mere hereditary right, to be reared by the care of their 
parents till they are capable of maintaining themselves; and this provision 
becomes immediately theirs by law, without any particular juridical Act 
being required to determine it.190  
Kant also believed that parents “have brought a Being into the world who becomes 
in fact a Citizen of the world, and they have placed that Being in a state which they 
cannot be left to treat with indifference.”191 As discussed in the following section, 
morality that evolved from both natural law and humanitarian principles is heavily 
relied upon when justifying the legal duty of parents to support their disabled adult 
children.192 
c. Noncustodial Parents’ Legal Duties to Support Disabled Adults Rely on Morality 
Both natural law and humanitarian perspectives played a significant role in the 
emergence of parents’ legal obligations to support their disabled adult children. It is 
evident from courts’ analysis that reliance on these morality concerns justified their 
decisions to provide an exception that disabled adults warrant continued support. 
Courts even go so far as to rely solely on moral justifications in creating mandated 
                                                          
 185  Public Library of Science, Why Do We Love Babies? Parental Instinct Region Found in 
The Brain, SCIENCEDAILY (Feb. 27, 2008), 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080226213448.htm (summarizing Annukka 
Lehtonen, et al., A Specific and Rapid Neural Signature for Parental Instinct, PLOS (Feb. 27, 
2008), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0001664). 
 186  Kuangfei Xie, Kindness Ethics: A Possible Approach to Virtue Ethics, 4 EDUC. J. 189 
(2015), http://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.edu.20150405.11.pdf. 
 187  Regina A. Nockerts & Peter W. Van Arsdale, A Theory of Obligation, J. HUMAN. 
ASSISTANCE (May 12, 2008), https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/138.  
 188  Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s Children: The Problems of 
Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 211-12 (2001). 
 189  Id. 
 190  IMMANUEL KANT, Rights of the Family as a Domestic Society, THE PHIL. OF LAW: AN 
EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURIS. AS THE SCI. OF RT. 3, 114 (Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796). 
 191  Id. at 115. 
 192  See infra text accompanying notes 194-205. 
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disabled adult support duties.193 Although most of the common law principles 
focusing on morality were subsequently codified, this should not change the courts’ 
underlying rationale and justifications. Because most statutes regarding the support 
of disabled adult children, including Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code, 
codify common law principles, this Note argues that courts should adhere to such 
underlying moral principles when interpreting whether they have jurisdiction over 
such matters rather than focusing on technicalities. 
Originally, most states did not impose a legal duty to continue supporting 
disabled children post-majority.194 However, new legislation in the area of family 
law began to surface when society adopted a new moral image of the family.195 The 
gradual appearance of societal concerns for the care of disabled adults created a new 
moral image of family in terms of parents supportingtheir disabled adult children. A 
general acceptance of a moral duty eventually transformed into a legal obligation to 
support disabled adult children.  
In 1984, the Ohio Supreme Court considered a parent’s continuing legal 
obligation to support a disabled child once the child has reached adulthood.196 The 
case before the Ohio Supreme Court presented a common-law question of first 
impression.197 The court held that, in the case of mentally or physically disabled 
children, there is both a moral and legal duty for parents to support and maintain 
disabled children through their adult life.198 Specifically, the court’s decision 
provided, “[But] where a child is of weak body or mind, unable to care for itself after 
coming of age, and remains unmarried and in the parent’s home, it has been held that 
the . . .  parent’s duty to support the child continues.”199 In reaching this conclusion 
and creating a new common law principle, the court relied heavily on morality.200 In 
justifying the decision, the court did not mention any independent fact-justifications; 
instead, it cited only to moral principles derived from the theory of natural law.201 
The decision in Castle later triggered the General Assembly to take action on the 
issue, and the Assembly subsequently codified the holding from this landmark case 
in 2001.202 
Today, family law cases and statutes continue to rely on parents’ moral 
obligations to support their disabled adult children when justifying this duty. In fact, 
it is agreed that this moral obligation comprises the “theoretical underpinnings” of 
the various common law and statutory authority holding parents responsible for the 
                                                          
 193  See Buhai, supra note 99, at 718. 
 194  Amy P. Hauser, Note, Child Custody for Disabled Adults: What Kentucky Families 
Need, 91 KY. L.J. 667, 669 (2002/2003). 
 195  Murphy, supra note 67. 
 196  Castle v. Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279 (1984). 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. at 283. 
 199  Id. at 282. 
 200  See generally id. 
 201  Id.  
 202  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (West 2016).  
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support of disabled adults.203 Like Ohio, other jurisdictions also rely on moral 
obligations to support disabled adults derived from natural law, humanitarian 
perspectives, and equitable reasons.204 
B. “Shavell Approach”: Optimizing Desired Results by Supplementing Moral 
Obligations with Legislation 
Despite this trend of reliance on morality, Ohio courts are split as to whether they 
have jurisdiction to initiate support after a disabled child turns eighteen.205 In sum, 
Ohio courts disagree as to whether they can rely on these morality concerns to justify 
their jurisdiction to initiate support or whether they must disregard such concerns 
and focus instead on technicalities. Because of the heavy reliance on morality in the 
area of family law—particularly in the realm of support obligations to dependents—
this Note argues that courts should follow precedent and rely on morality concerns to 
justify the jurisdiction and power to initiate support for disabled adults.  
While the question of whether morality should be legislated is still a highly 
debated topic, there are definite advantages in supplementing moral duties with legal 
obligations. Although it may be true that not all moral norms need legal 
reinforcement, and that regulating every aspect of morality is practically impossible, 
there are certain occasions where the interplay between these two methods of 
molding conduct are necessary. Notwithstanding the fact that society has the right to 
condemn certain acts or omissions as immoral, special circumstances are required to 
justify the intervention of the law.206 These special circumstances are described as 
the provision of “sufficient safeguards against exploitation . . . particularly those who 
are especially vulnerable because they are . . . weak in body or mind . . . or in a state 
of special physical . . . or economic dependence.”207 
Harvard Law School professor Steven Shavell accurately identifies the 
circumstances under which morality and law are necessary for optimal results 
regarding societal conduct.208 Under the “Shavell Approach,” it is essential to use 
law in supplement of moral obligations when the larger picture justifies doing so. In 
this case, the moral obligations extend to social benefits.209 The intertwining of law 
and morality are mandated under this approach when “the expected private gain 
                                                          
 203  48 A.L.R. 4TH 919, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to Support 
Child, Westlaw (current).   
 204  See Buhai, supra note 99, at 728-30. Those states that rely on either morality derived 
from natural law or humanity theories are: Alabama, New Jersey, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
and North Carolina. Id. 
 205  JUDGE DIANE M. PALOS, BALDWIN'S OH. PRAC. DOM. REL. L. § 19:5 (4TH ED.), Westlaw 
(database updated Dec. 2016).  
 206  Lord Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law 24, 34, 
http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Class%20Readings/Devlin/Devlin_Morals%20and%20th
e%20Criminal%20Law.pdf. 
 207  Id. at 35 (quoting The Wolfenden Report). 
 208  Shavell, supra note 38, at 246. For purposes of this Note, this author’s conclusions 
relating to the overlap of law and morality are referred to as the “Shavell Approach.” 
 209  Id. 
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from undesirable conduct is not too great, and the expected harm due to such 
conduct is also not too great.”210 
One underlying rationale behind such an approach to the intermingling of these 
realms of shaping behaviors is based on the notion that moral ramifications alone are 
insufficient to deter undesirable conduct when economic gains are high.211 When an 
individual stands to reap significant financial benefits, such enrichment often 
supersedes the guilt behind the negative conduct, causing the individual to choose 
economic incentives over moral conduct. Another justification for supplementing 
morality with legality focuses on how the failures to prevent certain immoral actions 
bear substantial consequences on society as whole.212 Under this circumstance, 
Shavell rightfully believes that the greater good afforded to society in averting 
unwanted behavior outweighs the extra expense of supplementing morality with 
legislation.213 
Shavell’s approach to law and morality is favorable for several reasons. First, 
adherence to this approach is advantageous because it recognizes the distinctions 
between morality and the law.214 Second, utilizing this approach is also beneficial 
because it recognizes that meshing these two concepts is sometimes inessential.215 
Lastly, the Shavell Approach is critical in analyzing which moral aspects warrant 
regulation because the theory creates a clear and compelling formula for identifying 
which moral domains to pursue legally. 
1. Application of “Shavell Approach”: Initiation of Noncustodial Support of 
Disabled Adult Children Requires Moral and Legal Overlap 
In light of current legislation based on morals, issues relating to whether morality 
should be legislated are beginning to dissolve. Instead, the focus shifts directly to 
which moral aspects should be regulated.216 Despite evidence supporting the moral 
domain behind family law, it is generally agreed that not every moral avenue within 
family law justifies legal intervention.217 With this reality in mind, the issue now 
becomes whether the moral obligation behind the support of disabled children 
through adulthood requires legal pursuit in giving Ohio courts the authority to 
initiate support for disabled adults. Viewing the issue in light of the compelling 
                                                          
 210  Id. at 247. 
 211  Id.  
 212  Id. 
 213  Id.  
 214  Id. Such distinctions include crimes where the actor escapes punishment or is not 
noticed. Supplementing morality with legislation is advantageous because moral incentives 
alone will not control this. Id. 
 215  Id. Morality alone is enough to shape behavior for things like keeping promises or 
lending a helping hand. Id. at 244-45. Laws do not need to be grounded in morality in 
situations where “expected private gains from bad conduct are large and the expected harms 
due to such conduct are also large.” Id. at 251. 
 216  Bauman, supra note 23. 
 217  Courtney G. Joslin, Not Equal Yet: Building Upon Foundations of Relationship 
Equality: The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623, 645-46 (Dec. 
2014). 
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Shavell Approach, the answer must be yes. Despite the current decline in reliance on 
morality in various areas of family law,218 Ohio legislators and courts should not 
deviate from the adherence to moral norms with regard to justification for the 
initiation of support for disabled adults. 
In determining whether law is required to supplement the moral obligation of 
such a duty, it is critical to carefully examine whether supplementing this moral duty 
is justified by its social benefits under the Shavell Approach.  In doing so, it is also 
imperative to examine whether the expected harms resulting from the failure of 
noncustodial parents to support their disabled adult children are also significant. 
Then, it is necessary to determine whether these harms will afford the noncustodial 
parent significant expected private gains associated with the undesirable conduct of 
failing to support his or her disabled adult child. 
After applying this approach, this Note concludes that legislating morality is 
necessary to give courts the power to initiate disabled adult support.219 When 
interpreting whether Ohio courts have jurisdiction to initiate such support pursuant 
to Ohio Revised Code Section 3119.86, courts should focus on the moral concerns 
underlying the enactment of this legislation, including the possibility that the 
noncustodial parent may reap unjust economic gains for failing to provide such 
support as well as the immense societal harm that would result from this conduct. 
a. Unjust Economic Gains and Immense Societal Harm as a Result of Financially 
Absent Noncustodial Parents 
 i. Harm to Custodial Parents: Financial Struggles and Limited Work 
Participation 
Marital strain often results from the financial tension and stress levels increased 
from the challenges of raising disabled children into adulthood, and this tension 
increases the probability of divorce.220 Beginning in the nineteenth century and 
continuing to modern day, the trend toward maternal preference has become the 
norm, and custody of “dependents” after a divorce is almost always awarded to the 
mother.221 An increase in divorce rates, paired with maternal preference in custody 
cases, creates a rise in single mothers who are forced into dealing with the high 
demands of caring for their disabled child into adulthood.222 In fact, more than one-
third of all households containing a disabled child are single-mother households.223 
Typically, disabled children needing continued care as adults often live at home 
with their custodial parent as their main source of support.224 As a result, such care 
                                                          
 218  Id. at 637-42. 
 219  See infra notes 220-52 and accompanying text. 
 220  ANTHONY GOUDIE ET AL., CARING FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN OHIO: THE 
IMPACT ON FAMILIES 3, 5, http://ddc.ohio.gov/Portals/0/OHFamImpStudyWhitePaper-
FINAL.pdf.  
 221  Hansen, supra note 87, at 1131 nn.40-41. 
 222  Id. at 1133.  
 223  GOUDIE ET. AL, supra note 220, at 7. 
 224  See Deborah Elbaum, Special Needs Care for Adult Children: Care Options, 
CARE.COM, http://www.care.com/special-needs-care-options-p1145-q5906.html. 
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comes at a substantial cost to custodial parents, placing the burden of determining 
how to cover the costs incurred from medical and other related expenses solely on 
his or her caregiver.225 Despite instinctual adaptations to the challenges associated 
with caring for a disabled adult, the reality is that single custodial parents of disabled 
adult children experience extreme financial hardship due to caregiving.226 
It is undisputed that the cost of raising and caring for children as a divorced 
custodial parent without noncustodial support creates substantial economic 
adversity. However, the cost of caring for severely disabled children through 
adulthood exacerbates economic hardships tremendously because severely disabled 
children continue to need care throughout the entirety of their lives.227 In 2009, about 
sixty-one million family caregivers in the United States provided care to an adult 
with a disability.228 In 2011, the estimated economic value of the informal care 
provided by family members was an astounding $234 billion.229 
While many options for care may be helpful and available to dependent disabled 
children and adults, these combined services can be extremely expensive.230 These 
expenses often force custodial parents to juggle multiple roles in relation to caring 
for their disabled adult children in lieu of professional aid.231 Some of these roles 
include handling medical bills and dealing with insurance claims, being responsible 
for nursing procedures performed at home, providing transportation to medical 
appointments and community services, and implementing care plans.232 More often 
                                                          
 225  Id.   
 226  “In 2009, more than one in four (27 percent) caregivers of adults reported a moderate to 
high degree of financial hardship as a result.” Lynn Feinberg, et al., Valuing the Invaluable: 
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 227  See, e.g., Jiyeon Park et al., Impacts of Poverty on Quality of Life in Families of 
Children with Disabilities, 68 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD., 151-52 (2002), 
https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/6058/FQL1_Impacts_of_poverty_on_Q
uality_8_07.pdf?sequence=1 (noting that 28% of disabled children, ages three to twenty-one, 
are living in families whose total income is below the poverty threshold set by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, whereas only 16% of children without disabilities in the same age group live 
in poverty.).  
 228  Feinberg, et al., supra note 226, at 1.  
 229  Elizabeth Shell, The $234 Billion Job That Goes Unpaid, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 25, 
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than not, single custodial parents of the disabled willingly take on these sometimes 
daunting tasks, but they do so at the cost of restricting the time the parent has to 
devote to work.233 This sacrifice creates a “tug-of-war” effect between the custodial 
parent’s need for employment due to the financial strains of caring for disabled adult 
children and the limited time available for employment due to the amount of care 
and attention that is required.234 
Similarly, single custodial parents can face astronomical financial adversity if 
they must leave the workforce entirely to meet their caregiver demands. Leaving the 
workforce due to these high demands can consequently result in not only the loss of 
earnings and social security benefits, but also the loss of career mobility and 
employment benefits like health insurance and retirement savings.235As a result, 
without the financial support of the noncustodial parent, both single parents and 
society suffer immense harm. Absent noncustodial support, the single parent must 
rely heavily on public welfare assistance to aid in the support of his or her disabled 
adult child. 
ii. Harm to Society: Dependency on State and Federal Welfare Assistance 
When noncustodial parents fail to provide financial support, it is inevitable that 
the custodial parent and disabled adult child utilize forms of public assistance, 
resulting in welfare dependency and depletion.236 Adults with severe disabilities are 
more likely to receive government benefits and other forms of cash assistance than 
adults with non-severe disabilities or no disabilities, directing a large portion of 
society’s tax dollars to the aid and benefit of this specific population.237 Expansive 
government, local entities, and programs have been implemented to provide aid to 
the disabled adult population.238 The states and federal governments provide an array 
of cash and benefits to alleviate the poverty and material hardship experienced by 
                                                          
 233  Sunhwa Lee, et al., The Impact of Disabilities on Mothers’ Work Participation: 
Examining Differences between Single and Married Mothers, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY 
RES. 5 (February 2004). 
 234  Id. 
 235  Feinberg et al., supra note 226, at 6.  
 236  Phillip K. Robins, Child Support, Welfare Dependency, and Poverty, 76 THE AM. 
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 237  See Brault, supra note 2, at 12.   
Adults with severe disabilities were also more likely to receive SSI benefits (19.5 
percent) and other forms of cash assistance (3.4 percent) than adults with non-severe 
or no disabilities. Adults with severe disabilities were more than 3 times as likely to 
receive SNAP benefits as those with no disabilities (28.1 percent compared with 8.3 
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single parents caring for their disabled adult children.239 In addition to income 
support, the federal government and the states provide health insurance to eligible 
individuals with disabilities.240 
Some scholars suggest that legislators creating support obligations were 
ultimately concerned with single mothers’ and their dependents’ reliance on welfare 
assistance.241 Evidence of this legislative concern appeared when English law began 
to recognize the social and economic problem associated with single mothers raising 
children by enacting “Poor Laws” in 1601.242 The Poor Laws imposed a duty on 
fathers to reimburse local community resources for the costs of providing aid and 
care to his indigent children and their single mothers.243 The Poor Laws only allotted 
local community resources the privilege of recovering financially on behalf of the 
                                                          
 239  Brault, supra note 2, at 12-13. These benefits include: 
Social Security Income (SSI): Supplemental Security Income is a needs-based 
program for the aged, blind, and disabled which is authorized by Title XVI of the 
Social Security Act and administered by the Social Security Administration. To 
qualify for SSI, a child or adult must have limited income and assets. SSI may be an 
individual’s only form of income, or SSI can supplement other income, such as SSDI 
or wages. It is possible to receive both SSI and SSDI. 
 
Social Security Disability (SSDI): A benefit available to people who have paid taxes 
to the Social Security Administration, a child may be eligible for this benefit if they 
child became disabled before his or her 22nd birthday, is 18 years of age or older, is 
not married, or has a parent who begins to get Social Security retirement or disability 
benefits or has a parent with a qualifying work history who dies.  
 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF):  The Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families program, also referred to as TANF, is an economic assistance 
program that is operated by the federal government. Individuals who qualify for 
TANF can receive a monthly cash benefit from the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services. The TANF program is operated at the state level and 
each state is given a block grant to design and administer the TANF program as they 
see fit. The amount of assistance available to a family through this program will 
depend on the family's household income and how many people are living in the 
household. 
 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP):  SNAP benefits are available to 
almost all low-income households.  People receiving Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) are automatically eligible for SNAP benefits. 
Id. 
 240  “Medicare, traditionally viewed as a benefit for the 65 and older population, is 
available to nonelderly adults with disabilities who receive Social Security Disability Income. 
Many state medical assistance/Medicaid programs also provide benefits to adults with 
disabilities who might not otherwise qualify.” Id.  
 241  Marsha Garrison, Anatomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental 
Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 42-43 (1998). 
 242  History of Child Support: Child Support Laws State by State, http://www.child-support-
laws-state-by-state.com/child-support.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 243  Garrison, supra note 241, at 49. 
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child.244 Some argue that this is indicative of legislators’ concerns about unnecessary 
depletion of welfare resources by the rise in single mothers and their dependents.245  
Without question, the concern about the unnecessary depletion of welfare resources, 
which is still present today, was justified. 
Currently, there are more than eighty federal welfare programs serving low-
income residents through cash, food, housing, medical care, and social services.246 
The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service indicates that as of 2011, 
federal spending on these programs had reached $746 billion per year—
more than expenditures for Medicare ($480 billion), Social Security ($725 
billion), or the military ($540 billion). In addition, state contributions into 
federal welfare programs amounted to $201 billion annually, while 
independent state programs contributed another $9 billion. All told, 
means-tested welfare spending from federal and state sources (combined) 
was $956 billion. America's $956 billion in annual welfare spending is 
distributed among approximately 100 million people—i.e., one-third of 
the U.S. population—who each month receive aid from at least one of the 
country's 80+ welfare programs. Average benefits amount to 
approximately $9,500 per recipient.247 
Without noncustodial parents’ support of disabled dependents, taxpayers will 
continue to bear the financial burden, and welfare resources will continue to deplete. 
C. Ohio Courts Interpretations Regarding Jurisdiction to Initiate Support for 
Disabled Adults Should Adhere to Moral Principles 
Commonly, state legislatures codify legal decisions in response to the courts’ 
rationale.248 In Ohio, state legislators codified the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in 
Castle in order to properly address the societal issue of support for disabled adults.249 
When the General Assembly adopts a common law decision, transforming it into 
state law, the legislature often adopts the underlying principles and justifications 
behind the court’s rulings. However, if the wording of a statute is ambiguous, the 
courts often employ the underlying common-law principles to interpret the statute.250 
Because the language of Ohio Revised Code Section 3119.86 is unclear as to 
whether family law courts have jurisdiction to initiate support orders for disabled 
children post-majority, Ohio courts should utilize common-law principles from 
Castle. 
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29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
484 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:455 
 
Per an analysis of the Ohio courts’ stances on the issue of support initiation for 
disabled adults, only the Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and Twelfth District Courts of 
Appeals accurately reflect the principles underlying Castle.251 The interpretations 
cast by these four districts should prevail, and Section 3119.86 should be interpreted 
to allow domestic relations courts to have jurisdiction over support matters initiated 
after the disabled child reaches the age of majority. 
1. Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Appellate Districts’ View: Disabled Adult Never 
“Reaches Age of Majority” 
In analyzing the issue of whether domestic relations courts could exercise 
jurisdiction over support cases initiated after the disabled child has reached the age 
of majority, the Sixth District Court of Appeals in Wiczynski allowed for the support 
of a disabled child in adulthood, despite no support order being in place prior to the 
child turning eighteen.252 
In reaching its conclusion, the Wiczynski court relied heavily on the legal 
principles and justifications in the Castle decision.253 Although the decision in Castle 
did not directly address the present question before the Sixth District Court of 
Appeals, the court reasoned that the analysis and ultimate holding in Castle provides 
instruction on how the court should resolve the issue in the present case.254 In 
particular, the Wiczynski court was guided by Castle’s interpretation that disabled 
adults are exempt from the strict “age of majority” limitation on support orders.255 
The Wiczynski court even saw this interpretation reiterated in Section 3109.01 of the 
Ohio Revised Code.256 Using these foregoing interpretations as a guide, the court 
ultimately determined that the disabled child, who was unable to support himself had 
never reached the “age of majority,” was still a minor in the law’s eyes because of 
his mental condition.257 Because the disabled adult had never reached the “age of 
majority” as interpreted under Castle and Section 3109.01, the Wiczynski court held 
that it could retain jurisdiction to issue support for the disabled adult.258 
The Seventh District Court of Appeals in Abbas took a similar approach in 
resolving the issue of whether the domestic relations court exercises jurisdiction over 
                                                          
 251  See Donohoo v. Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105 (12th Dist.); In re Edgell, 2010-Ohio-6435 
(11th Dist.); Wiczynski v. Wiczynski, 2006-Ohio-867, at *23 (6th Dist.); Abbas v. Abbas, 715 
N.E.2d 613, 615-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).  
 252  See Wiczynski, 2006-Ohio-867, at *23. 
 253  Id. at *15-21. 
 254  Id. at *17. 
 255  Id. at *16.  
[T]he domestic relations court retains jurisdiction over parties in a divorce, dissolution 
or separation proceeding to continue or to modify support payments for a mentally or 
physically disabled child who was so disabled before he or she attained the statutory 
age of majority, as if the child were still an infant.  
Id. (quoting Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ohio 1984) (emphasis in original). 
 256  Id. at *21. 
 257  Id. at *23. 
 258  Id.  
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support cases initiated for disabled adults. In relying on legal principles from Castle, 
the Abbas court determined that, although the trial court did not initially order child 
support payments, it was able to do so later because of its retention of jurisdiction 
over the parties.259 The Abbas court reasoned that pursuant to Castle, it retained 
jurisdiction over the support order of the disabled adult because, by granting to the 
mother custody of the twenty-five year old, the court was asserting that James had 
not reached the age of majority.260 Therefore, the Abbas court maintained continuing 
jurisdiction over all parties.261 
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals in In re Edgell also adopted the “lack of 
age of majority” view shared by the Sixth and Seventh districts in addressing 
jurisdictional issues when the marriage terminates after the mentally or physically 
disabled child has reached the age of majority.262 Also relying on legal principles 
codified from Castle, the Eleventh District determined that the court had power to 
exercise jurisdiction over the support of the disabled adult.263 
2. Alternative Eleventh District’s View: Castle Requires Parental “Duty of Support” 
to Continue, Not the Continuance of a Pre-Existing Support Order 
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals in In re Palcisco took a slightly different 
approach (while still adhering to principles in Castle) in resolving the issue of 
whether the domestic relations court has jurisdiction to initiate a support order for a 
disabled child who has already reached the age of majority at the time of the parents’ 
divorce.264 In reaching its conclusion that jurisdiction existed, the court reasoned that 
the statute addressing this matter merely codified the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision 
that the moral and legal obligation to support disabled children does not stop simply 
because the disabled child turns eighteen, unlike traditional support orders regarding 
children with no disabilities.265 
The court, therefore, reasoned that the text of Section 3119.86(A) does not 
support the contention that a support order must be in existence to continue beyond 
the child’s eighteenth birthday.266 Rather, the statute states that it is the duty of 
support, not the support order itself, that shall continue where the child is mentally or 
physically disabled, and this specific language came directly from Castle.267 This 
duty to support exists irrespective of a child support order under Castle. Thus, the 
Eleventh District found, “[T]he lack of a support order poses no impediment to the 
continuation of [non-custodial parent’s] duty to support, which is conditioned upon 
the child’s disability.”268 
                                                          
 259  Abbas v. Abbas, 715 N.E.2d 613, 615-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
 260  Id.  
 261  Id.  
 262  In re Edgell, 2010-Ohio-6435, at *39 (11th Dist.). 
 263  Id. at 38-40. 
 264  In re Palcisco, 2012-Ohio-6134, *23-24 (11th Dist.). 
 265  Id. at *20. 
 266  Id. at *22. 
 267  Id. 
 268  Id.  
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3. Twelfth District’s View: Absurd Result of Two Distinct Classes of Disabled 
Adults 
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals in Donohoo also found that jurisdiction 
existed for domestic relation courts to initiate child support orders for disabled 
adults.269 The Donohoo court provided that “we do not read anything in R.C. 
3119.86 that prohibits a domestic relations court from ordering child support for 
disabled children after the child turns 18.”270 The Donohoo court further noted, 
“When the Legislature codified the Ohio Supreme Court’s Castle decision, we 
believe that the Legislature was codifying Ohio’s common law principle that the 
obligation to support a disabled child remains even after that child has turned 18.”271 
However, the Donohoo court took another view on the issue of jurisdiction over 
support orders for disabled adults initiated post-majority. The Twelfth district 
reasoned that section 3119.86 should not be interpreted “in such a way as to create 
two distinct classes of disabled children, those who did not turn 18 before their 
parents’ divorce and therefore are entitled to support, and those who just happened to 
turn 18 after the divorce and therefore are not entitled to support.”272 The Donohoo 
court further provided, “Hinging a disabled person’s entitlement to support, 
regardless of the need, upon the timing of the divorce makes no sense.”273 If this 
were the case, it may give parents motivation in bad faith to postpone divorce 
proceeding until after their disabled child reaches the age of majority in order to 
evade support obligations. One cannot fathom that principles behind the Castle 
would intend such an absurd result. 
4. Tenth District’s View: Odd Ball Case-Strict Textual View Inconsistent with 
Castle Principles 
The Tenth District Court of Appeals in Geygan came to an opposite conclusion 
of the aforementioned districts and ruled that domestic relations courts lack 
jurisdiction to initiate support orders after a disabled child has reached the age of 
majority.274 The Geygan court reasoned that had the Ohio legislature intended to 
permit the domestic relations court to impose child support orders during a divorce 
proceeding after the disabled child has already reached eighteen years old, it would 
have expressly stated so.275 The court emphasized that the statute provides that the 
“duty of support to a child imposed pursuant to a court child support order shall 
continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday.”276 The court continued, “In 
enacting R.C. 3119.86, the General Assembly considered the question of child 
support for adult children with disabilities.”277 Further, the court explained that “[i]n 
                                                          
 269  Donohoo v. Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105 at *23 (12th Dist.).  
 270  Id. at *17 (emphasis in original). 
 271  Id. at *18. 
 272  Id.    
 273  Id.    
 274  Geygan v. Geygan, 973 N.E.2d 276, 281-83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965). 
 275  Id. at *21-22. 
 276  Id. at *10. 
 277  Id. at *17. 
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so doing, legislators chose to incorporate the words ‘continue’ and ‘beyond’” which 
could have “very easily been deleted” by the General Assembly “and stated simply 
that child support may be imposed for a child who is over the age of 18 and is 
mentally or physically disabled and incapable of supporting or maintaining himself 
or herself.”278 Based on those reasons alone, the Geygan court concluded “that the 
domestic relations court lacked jurisdiction to enter a child support order relating to 
[the disabled child who was over the age of majority] at the time of the final 
judgment entry.”279 
The Tenth Sistrict’s strict textual view, however, deviates from principles and 
justifications in Castle, so Geygan should not be followed. Castle clearly identified 
that the overall duty of support for disabled children incapable of self-support 
continues beyond the age of majority.280 Nothing in the Castle decision suggests that 
there is a limitation requiring a support order for a disabled child to be in place prior 
to the child reaching eighteen. In fact, the only limitation imposed by the Ohio 
Supreme Court in Castle is that the underlying disabling condition must have existed 
prior to the child reaching the age of majority.281 As the Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh and 
Twelfth districts have reiterated, the statute that Geygan has wrongly interpreted 
codifies the legal decision in Castle; therefore, courts must follow rationales and 
principles set forth within the Supreme Court’s decision. 
D. Brief Overview of Other States’ Stances on Jurisdiction to Initiate Support For 
Disabled Adults 
The subsequent cases and laws from other jurisdictions allow for the initiation of 
support for a disabled adult after that child has reached the age of majority: 
 
• In California, legislation relies on the common law principle that parents 
have a compelling moral duty to care for their adult disabled children. 
The California statue relating to this matter requires that “parents have a 
duty to maintain . . . a child of whatever age who is incapacitated from 
earning a living and without sufficient means.”282 
• Legislation in South Carolina allows courts to initiate the support of 
disabled adult children on the justification that it is in the best interest of 
the child and is beneficial to the family.283 
• Tennessee and South Dakota both follow a humanitarian belief that 
parents should support their adult disabled children because the need for 
support exists, and humanity requires parents to support their children 
before majority should also continue post-majority.284 Specifically, 
                                                          
 278  Id. 
 279  Id. at *20. 
 280  Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803, 805-06 (Ohio 1984). 
 281  Id.  
 282  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910(a) (West 2016). 
 283  Buhai, supra note 99, at 736 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §20-7-420 (17) (1985 & Supp. 
2005)). 
 284  Id. at 733. 
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“Both [states] provide that parents owe a duty of support to their adult 
disabled children because these children are as helpless as infants.”285 
• Oregon law provides, “Parents are bound to maintain their children who 
are poor and unable to work to maintain themselves. Nature imposes a 
duty of child support for adult disabled children.”286 
• In Kentucky, child support for an adult handicapped child is governed 
by statute, which provides that both parents “shall have joint custody, 
care, and support of their children who have reached the age of eighteen 
(18) and who are wholly dependent because of permanent physical or 
mental disability.”287 This statute holds both parents responsible for a 
child who is wholly dependent when he becomes eighteen.288 
Jurisdiction over child support cases in Kentucky further notes that 
concurrent jurisdiction rests with the district and circuit courts to 
establish, modify, and enforce obligations of child support in situations 
where paternity is not a concern.289 
• In New Jersey, in support of the initiation of support for disabled adults, 
courts provided that common sense and normal instincts of humanity 
called for an obligation of support of their disabled adult children.290 
E. New View: Proposed Amendment to R.C. § 3119.86 as a Resolution to the Divide 
in Interpretation of Initiation of Support for Disabled Adults 
In order to properly address this split amongst Ohio courts, there needs to be a 
change that comes directly from the legislature. The Ohio legislature should amend 
Ohio Revised Code Section 3119.86 to provide that the obligation of support for 
disabled adults shall continue beyond the age of majority regardless of whether or 
not the support order was implemented prior to the disabled child reaching the age of 
majority. Such an amendment will help eliminate the absurd and unintended result of 
punishing disabled, dependent adults whose parents decided to wait to divorce until 
after the child reached the age of majority. Below is the proposed amendment to 
current legislation: 
 
Ohio Revised Code § 3119.86: Continuance of Support Obligation beyond a 
Child’s Eighteenth Birthday. 
 
(A) Notwithstanding section 3109.01 of the Revised Code, both of the following 
apply: 
                                                          
 285  Id. (citing Mower v. Mower, 199 N.W. 42, 42 (S.D. 1924); Sayne v. Sayne, 284 
S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tenn. 1955)).  
 286  Buhai, supra note 99, at 736, (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §109.010 (West 2016)). 
 287  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.020(2) (West 2016). 
 288  Id.   
 289  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.766 (West 2016). 
 290  Kruvant v. Kruvant, 241 A.2d 259, 265-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968). 
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(1) The father and mother shall provide support of their children who 
have reached the age of eighteen (18) if any of the following apply: 
(a) The child is wholly dependent because of a permanent 
mental or physical disability and thus is incapable of 
supporting or maintaining himself or herself. 
(b) The child’s parents have agreed to continue support 
beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday pursuant to a 
separation agreement that was incorporated into a decree 
of divorce or dissolution. 
(c) The child continuously attends a recognized and 
accredited high school on a full-time basis on and after the 
child’s eighteenth birthday. 
(B) Concurrent jurisdiction rests with the domestic relations courts to establish, 
modify, and enforce obligations of child support if section 3119.86 
(A)(1)(a), section 3119.86(A)(1)(b), or section 3119.86(A)(1)(c) is satisfied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current reality is that if Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code is not 
amended, Ohio divorce courts will have the unfettered discretion to circumvent 
jurisdiction to initiate support orders for disabled adults, based solely on the timing 
of their caregivers’ divorce. Without any attempt to rectify this ambiguity in the law, 
single caregivers bear a substantial part in the financial responsibility their disabled 
adult child while the noncustodial parents are relinquished of their legal obligations. 
Because of the inevitable overlap between law and morality in American law, 
especially in the area of family law, Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code 
should be interpreted to reflect the overlap between a parent’s moral and legal duties 
and recognize the courts’ powers to initiate support orders for disabled adults. It is 
evident that optimized results occur when the legislature supplements moral 
obligations with legislation. Further, it is even more apparent that the moral duty to 
support disabled children throughout adulthood triggered legislative action in the 
first place. In order to prevent disabled children from being denied continued support 
by a noncustodial parent in a divorce solely because the divorce occurred once the 
disabled child reached adulthood, this Ohio law must be amended to expressly 
mandate that courts have the authority to initiate support orders for disabled adult 
children, regardless of the timing of their caregivers’ divorce. 
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